The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee requires juries — not judges — to find the aggravating facts necessary to impose the death penalty.
Timothy Ring and two accomplices robbed an armored truck in Maricopa County, Arizona in November 1994, killing the driver, John Magoch. Ring was convicted of first-degree murder. Under Arizona law at the time, a judge — not the jury — determined whether to impose the death penalty. After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the trial judge held a separate sentencing hearing and found two aggravating circumstances: that the murder was committed for financial gain and that it was especially heinous or cruel. Based on those findings, the judge sentenced Ring to death. Ring challenged his death sentence, arguing that requiring a judge — rather than the jury — to find the aggravating facts that made him death-eligible violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. He relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), in which the Supreme Court had held that any fact that increases a defendant's maximum sentence beyond what the jury's verdict alone supports must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona's sentencing scheme was the most extreme version of a common practice: 9 states used judge-only capital sentencing schemes at the time. Under Walton v. Arizona (1990), the Supreme Court had previously upheld Arizona's judge-sentencing system. Ring's lawyers argued that Apprendi had effectively overruled Walton. Arizona responded that the Court had explicitly preserved Walton in Apprendi itself, and that death penalty sentencing remained a constitutionally special category that the Apprendi rule did not reach.
Does the Sixth Amendment require a jury — not a judge — to find the aggravating circumstances that make a defendant death-eligible?
The Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury — not a judge — to find any aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death penalty. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, overruling Walton v. Arizona (1990). The majority held that Apprendi v. New Jersey applied to capital sentencing: because Arizona's aggravating factors were the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense (making the defendant death-eligible), the Constitution required a jury to find them beyond a reasonable doubt. The ruling invalidated judge-only capital sentencing schemes in Arizona and eight other states. It required those states to restructure their capital sentencing procedures to give juries the fact-finding role. Justices Scalia and Thomas, while joining the majority, also joined a separate concurrence (written by Scalia) that went further: arguing that the entire framework of individualized capital sentencing — which the Court had required since Furman v. Georgia (1972) — was irreconcilable with the Sixth Amendment, and should itself be reconsidered. O'Connor dissented, joined by Rehnquist.
How the justices lined up in this decision.
States with judge-determined aggravating-factor systems for capital cases had to change procedures so juries find aggravating factors before a death sentence; many death sentences were vacated or remanded for new proceedings, and the decision limited judicial discretion in capital sentencing while expanding the jury's role in determining facts that increase punishment.