Trump Proposes Ending Pentagon Programs Training European Armies Against Russia
Congress overrode Trump's move to cut Baltic military training funds
On September 4, 2025, the Trump administration announced it would not request congressional renewal of two Pentagon programs: Section 333 security cooperation — authorized under 10 U.S. Code § 333 since 2016 — and the Baltic Security Initiative, a dedicated program for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established in the FY2021 NDAA. Together, the programs had delivered more than $1.6 billion to Europe from 2018 to 2022, with $231 million going to the three Baltic states in fiscal year 2025 alone. The Washington Post and Bloomberg first reported the announcement on September 4, 2025, citing Pentagon officials who had notified European diplomatic contacts at a closed-door Washington meeting.
The administration's stated rationale was burden-sharing: European NATO allies should pay more for their own defense. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had told NATO defense ministers in Brussels in February 2025 that 'stark strategic realities' required the United States to prioritize Indo-Pacific deterrence and that European allies must 'take ownership of conventional security on the continent.' At the June 24-25, 2025 Hague NATO Summit, all 32 allies (except Spain) committed to reaching 5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035 — a target shaped directly by Trump's pressure. But the three Baltic states had already exceeded NATO's previous 2% benchmark: Lithuania spent 4.0%, Latvia 3.73%, and Estonia 3.38% of GDP on defense in 2025, each ranking in NATO's top five.
Section 333, codified at 10 U.S. Code § 333, grants the Secretary of Defense authority to train and equip foreign militaries, but requires Secretary of State concurrence and semi-annual monitoring reports from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to Congress. The administration did not invoke the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 — which would have required a formal rescission request approved by Congress within 45 days — but instead simply declined to request renewal in the FY2026 budget. This distinction matters: a budget non-request lets funding expire without the procedural protections the 1974 Act provides.
The Baltic Security Initiative had funded more than $1 billion in training, joint exercises, and equipment transfers to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania between 2021 and 2025. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies documented on September 9, 2025 that discontinuation would 'primarily have a negative effect by reducing the scale, intensity, and frequency of military exercises' with U.S. forces — and that between 2014 and 2025, Lithuania's military expenditure had risen more than eightfold, Latvia's increased more than fivefold, and Estonia's tripled.
Congress responded with bipartisan speed. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI) led the effort to restore the Baltic Security Initiative in the FY2026 NDAA. In December 2025, the final bill authorized $175 million for the BSI through fiscal year 2028 — a three-year commitment that directly overrode the White House budget proposal. The Senate voted 77-20; the House voted 312-112. Trump signed the NDAA on December 18, 2025, without an Oval Office ceremony.
The $175 million authorized in the FY2026 NDAA is roughly $56 million less than the $231 million the BSI delivered in fiscal year 2025 — a reduction that reflects the compromise required to move the bill through a Republican-controlled Congress uncomfortable with overriding the president too visibly. The NDAA also included separate guardrails prohibiting the administration from unilaterally reducing U.S. troop levels in Europe without prior congressional notification.
The episode exposed a recurring constitutional tension: the president proposes the federal budget and sets military priorities through commander-in-chief authority, but Congress appropriates all defense spending and authorizes programs through the NDAA process. Article I of the Constitution's Appropriations Clause states that no money may be drawn from the Treasury without a congressional appropriation. The December 2025 NDAA created a legal obligation for the administration to spend the $175 million — spending it would require either compliance or a formal Impoundment Control Act rescission request that Congress could then vote down.
The European Deterrence Initiative — the broader framework within which both Section 333 and the BSI operate — was created in June 2014, three months after Russia's annexation of Crimea, and grew from $1 billion to over $6.5 billion in peak FY2019 funding before declining. The 2025 decision compressed more than a decade of institutional investment into a single budget line. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provide the broader statutory framework for U.S. security cooperation — the administration's power to shape the priority and scope of these programs exists within statutory limits Congress defines.