Congress advances US-Israel defense technology cooperation in 2027 NDAA
Congress buries a permanent US-Israel military tech merger in the defense bill
Photo: Kevin Dietsch / Getty Images
The House Armed Services Committee approved the FY2027 NDAA by a 44-12 vote on June 4, 2026, after a 14-hour markup session with nearly 900 amendments. Section 224 โ the United States-Israel Defense Technology CooperationFormal agreements between the United States and allied or partner nations to jointly develop, share, or co-produce military technologies โ combining research investment, manufacturing capacity, and interoperability goals.Key ConceptDefense Technology CooperationFormal agreements between the United States and allied or partner nations to jointly develop, share, or co-produce military technologies โ combining research investment, manufacturing capacity, and interoperability goals.Open concept Initiative โ survived intact after Rep. Ro Khanna's amendment to remove it was defeated on a voice vote with only Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA) supporting him. The provision requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior executive agent to coordinate bilateral defense technology cooperation with Israel, covering AI, autonomous systems, cyber and electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, biotechnology, missile defense, and defense industrial co-production.
Section 224 does not create a joint command structure or transfer operational control to any Israeli authority. What it does is institutionalize a coordination layer between the two defense establishments that critics say would be difficult to unwind once embedded in Pentagon bureaucracy.
The NDAA is Congress's primary annual vehicle for setting military policy. It authorizes โ but does not fund โ defense programs. A separate defense appropriations bill provides the actual dollars. Because the NDAA must pass every year, provisions embedded in it gain unusual durability: they establish programs, create offices, and direct cooperation that subsequent administrations inherit without fresh congressional authorization.
AIPAC publicly endorsed Section 224. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL) defended the provision as a simple coordination improvement that designates a single senior official to coordinate existing initiatives. Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) announced he would offer a House floor amendment to remove it, joining a rare libertarian-progressive coalition of critics.
The U.S.-Israel formal defense relationship began in 1962 when President Kennedy approved the sale of Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel โ the first U.S. government weapons sale to Israel. The sale followed Israeli requests going back to 1960 and was driven in part by Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria. Pentagon officials supported the sale on strategic grounds; Kennedy conditioned it on Israeli concessions regarding the Dimona nuclear research facility. The Hawk sale opened the door to a pattern that has continued: U.S. administrations approving increasingly sophisticated weapons to Israel while seeking some form of Israeli policy concession in return.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War made the U.S.-Israeli defense relationship institutionally durable. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israeli forces. Nixon ordered Operation Nickel Grass, an emergency airlift of 22,395 tons of tanks, artillery, and ammunition aboard C-141 Starlifters and C-5 Galaxies. The total emergency resupply reached $2.2 billion.
Nickel Grass established an implicit commitment that had not previously existed: the U.S. would resupply Israel in wartime, not merely sell it weapons in peacetime. No formal treaty created this commitment. It emerged through executive action in a crisis.
Congress named Israel a Major Non-NATO AllyA U.S. legal designation giving select foreign partners preferential access to defense equipment and joint R&D without a NATO collective defense commitment.Key ConceptMajor Non-NATO AllyA U.S. legal designation giving select foreign partners preferential access to defense equipment and joint R&D without a NATO collective defense commitment.Open concept in 1987, giving it preferential access to defense equipment, joint research and development programs, and the right to host U.S. war reserve stockpiles. The designation is created under 22 U.S.C. 2321k and provides benefits available to NATO members without any reciprocal collective defense obligation. Israel was the first country designated under this category.
The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Obama administration, committed $38 billion over 10 years โ $3.3 billion per year in Foreign Military Financing and $500 million per year in missile defense funding โ running from fiscal year 2019 through 2028. It was the largest military aid package to any country in U.S. history.
The U.S. co-developed multiple weapons systems with Israel that are now globally significant. The Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system received over $1.6 billion in U.S. development funding and an additional $1 billion in 2021 supplemental appropriations to replenish interceptors used in Gaza fighting. David's Sling, developed jointly by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon (now RTX), became operational in 2017 and is manufactured by teams in nearly 30 U.S. states. The Arrow anti-ballistic missile system was developed with Boeing as U.S. co-developer.
Section 224's push for expanded co-production in AI and autonomous systems extends this joint industrial model into domains with less legal clarity and more potential for civilian harm.
The Leahy LawA U.S. law barring military aid to foreign security force units credibly implicated in gross human rights violations.Key ConceptLeahy LawA U.S. law barring military aid to foreign security force units credibly implicated in gross human rights violations.Open concept (22 U.S.C. 2378d) bars U.S. military assistance to any foreign security force unit when there is credible information that unit committed a gross violation of human rights. Former State Department human rights official Charles Blaha confirmed that no Israeli military unit has ever been found ineligible under the Leahy Law, despite documented evidence of violations. Blaha described a mountain of evidence of Israeli military conduct meeting the statutory threshold and confirmed that extraordinary internal State Department policies provide deference to Israel not extended to any other U.S. ally.
William Hartung of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft documented that the U.S. spent $21.7 billion in military aid to Israel in the two years following October 7, 2023, with tens of billions more in committed arms sale agreements.
The February 28, 2026 joint U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran โ Operation Epic Fury and Operation Lion's Roar โ marked the first time the two militaries had jointly attacked a third country. U.S. and Israeli forces launched nearly 900 strikes in 12 hours targeting Iranian air defenses, military infrastructure, and command networks. A conditional ceasefire took effect April 8.
Section 224 advancing through the NDAA four months after this joint operation is not coincidental. The joint strike required precisely the interoperability โ shared targeting systems, coordinated AI-assisted battle management, integrated cyber operations โ that Section 224 would formally institutionalize.
Unit 8200, the signals intelligence branch of the Israeli military, functions as Israel's equivalent of the NSA. In 2009, the NSA and Unit 8200 signed an intelligence-sharing agreement under which the NSA provides unevaluated intercepts, voice recordings, and metadata to Israel. Unit 8200 is widely credited as a co-developer of Stuxnet, the cyberweapon that destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges in the late 2000s. The unit shares intelligence on cyber threats with the CIA, MI6, and other Western allies.
Section 224's authorization for expanded U.S.-Israeli cooperation in cyber and electronic warfare would create formal channels alongside the existing informal intelligence-sharing relationship, potentially expanding the scope of what the two countries develop jointly in offensive cyber capabilities.
Israel's Lavender AI system was reported by +972 Magazine in April 2024 to have identified approximately 37,000 potential targets in Gaza. Human analysts reportedly spent an estimated 20 seconds reviewing each AI recommendation before approving strikes. The AI system trained on data that loosely defined Hamas operative in ways that reportedly included civil defense workers.
DoD Directive 3000.09, updated in January 2023, requires that autonomous weapon systems allow commanders to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force. Section 224's mandate to integrate U.S. and Israeli AI capabilities raises the question of whether U.S. standards for autonomous weapons would apply to jointly developed systems used by Israel.